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363 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE WTO AND THE 
ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY∗ 
MITSUO MATSUSHITA∗∗ 
I. PHILOSOPHY COMMON TO COMPETITION POLICY AND THE WTO 
Both competition policy and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
aim to promote and maintain a free and open trading system. The WTO’s 
task is to establish an international trading system based on a free and 
open market, and competition policy that covers both domestic and 
international markets. However, the similarity of their purposes and 
objectives is unmistakable. The WTO tries to reduce and eliminate 
governmental trade barriers, such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. 
Under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) of 1947, eight trade negotiations were conducted, the last of 
which was the Uruguay Round (1986-1993). The WTO was created as a 
result of the Uruguay Round, which was about fifty years after the 
proposals for the Havana Charter and International Trade Organization 
failed. 
As will be discussed later, the WTO is based on the principles of most-
favored-nation treatment (“MFN”), national treatment, and transparency. 
These three principles are the most fundamental principles of the WTO, 
and all are designed to establish and maintain non-discrimination and 
openness in the international market. The principles of MFN and national 
treatment establish “a level playing field” among participants in 
international trade in different nations by eliminating discriminatory 
measures adopted by Member governments.1 The principle of 
 
 
 ∗ A version of this Article was previously published in Journal of World Investment, Vol. 3, 
No. 4 (Aug. 2002). This Article is being reprinted as a part of this symposium with the publisher’s and 
the Author’s permission. All Japanese language sources were verified by Global Studies. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law at Seikei University, Tokyo, Japan, and former member of the WTO 
Appellate Body. This Article is based on a paper submitted to the WTO-UNCTAD Joint Symposium 
on Trade and Competition Policy: Looking Ahead after Doha, held at the WTO, Geneva, Switzerland, 
on April 22, 2002. The Author can be contacted at: mtm@dd.iij4u.or.jp. 
 1. The MFN principle is declared in Article 1 of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
T.IA.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 
I.L.M. 1167 (“GATS”) and Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (“TRIPs Agreement”). The principle of national treatment is stated in Article 
III of the GATT, Article II of the GATS and Article 3 of the TRIPs Agreement. 
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transparency as incorporated in Article X of the GATT, Article III of the 
GATS and Article 63 of the TRIPs Agreement ensures the openness of 
governmental regulations and thereby helps maintain predictability for 
players in international trade. 
The coverage of competition policy extends not only to international 
trade but also to the purely domestic market. The objectives of 
competition policy vary from country to country. Competition policy aims 
at controlling not only the activities of private enterprise but also 
governmental restrictions. In this latter respect, competition policy shares 
a common goal with the GATT/WTO. The goal of Competition Policy is 
to establish and maintain the freedom of enterprises, the equality of the 
competitive conditions under which they compete, and the openness of 
markets. 
A striking similarity exists between the objectives of the WTO and 
those of competition policy. The key concepts common to both are, inter 
alia, promotion of an open market, provision of fair and equal business 
opportunities to every participant in the market, transparency and fairness 
in the regulatory process, the promotion of efficiency, and the 
maximization of consumer welfare. 
II. PROVISIONS IN THE WTO AGREEMENTS CLOSELY RELATED TO 
COMPETITION POLICY 
A number of provisions in WTO Agreements are closely related to 
competition policy and, in this sense, competition policy is part of the 
WTO. Examples can be found in GATS, TRIPs, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs Agreement”), the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT 
Agreement”) and the Agreement on Safeguards.2 They are scattered 
 
 
 2. The following are the major provisions in the WTO Agreements closely related to 
competition policy: (a) Article 8.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that Members shall not take 
measures which have the effect, directly or indirectly, of requiring or encouraging non-governmental 
bodies performing conformity assessment procedures of products to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the provisions of Article 5 (the national treatment principle) and Article 6 (TBT measures to be no 
more restrictive than necessary) of the TBT Agreement; (b) Article VIII of the TATS provides that 
each Member shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in its territory does not, in the 
supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with the Member’s 
obligations under Article II (the national treatment principle) and specific commitments; (c) Article 40 
of the TRIPs Agreement authorizes Members to enact legislation prohibiting restrictive conditions 
attached to licensing agreements regarding intellectual properties; (d) Article 9 of the TRIMs 
Agreement provides that, within five years after the entering into force of this Agreement, the Council 
for Trade in Goods shall consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with provisions on 
investment policy and competition policy; (e) Article 11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards prohibits 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/10
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around in different WTO Agreements without being integrated into a 
coherent body of competition rules. Perhaps due in part to this lack of 
integration, those provisions have not been effectively utilized to date. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the drafters of the WTO 
Agreements realized the need to incorporate competition provisions. For 
example, the enforcement of the disciplines of Article 113 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards against “voluntary export restraints” cannot be 
effective unless its Article 11.34 prohibits Members from directing or 
encouraging private exporters from engaging in restrictive activities which 
may forestall the overall disciplines of Article 11. Likewise, the objectives 
of the TBT Agreement cannot be accomplished unless its Article 8.15 
prohibition on Members encouraging private trade organizations engaged 
in product testing and certification to exercise discriminatory restrictions, 
which would be held as inconsistent with the WTO disciplines if exercised 
by the governments themselves. 
As trade liberalization progresses through international negotiations, 
issues of how to deal with private trade restraints exercised by private 
enterprises will become increasingly important. When governments 
control international trade, cartels and other similar restraints of 
international trade are relatively unimportant, because trade is restricted by 
the public authorities anyway and there is relatively little room for private 
 
 
Members from encouraging or supporting the adoption or maintenance by public and private 
enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to export restraint exercised by the government; 
(f) Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that, in determining injury, the administering 
authority must take into account, inter alia, “trade-restrictive practices of the competition between the 
foreign and domestic producers . . .” 
 3. Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides “A Member shall not take or seek 
any emergency action on imports of particular products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994 
unless such action conforms with the provisions of that Article applied in accordance with this 
Agreement.” 
 4. Article 11.3 provides “Members shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance 
by public and private enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in 
paragraph 1.” This provision prohibits Members from promoting and encouraging restrictive activities 
exercised by private exporters and importers, such as export and import cartels. In this broad sense, 
this provision may be categorized as competition policy. Id. art. 11.3. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 
I.L.M. 112. See also WTO, WTO Legal Texts, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2004). 
 5. Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-
governmental bodies within their territories operating conformity assessment procedures comply with 
the provisions of Articles 5 and 6. In addition, Members shall not take measures that directly or 
indirectly have the effect of requiring or encouraging such bodies to act in a matter inconsistent with 
the provisions of Articles 5 and 6. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 4. 
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restraints of trade. However, where trade liberalization has been achieved, 
the trading system requires that private trade restraints be dealt with in 
particular ways. 
It is therefore appropriate for WTO Members, trade negotiators, 
government officials, academics, business communities, lawyers and 
others to think about the relationship between the WTO system and 
competition policy. The result of such thinking may result in the 
establishment of an agreement adopting a form of competition provision in 
the WTO Agreements or outside the WTO system. Whether such an 
agreement is established within the WTO or outside it does not matter so 
much. What is important is that international competition policy, in some 
form, operates effectively. 
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE WTO 
A. National Treatment 
National treatment is regarded as one of the cornerstones of the WTO. 
Especially relevant to our purpose here is Article III.4 of the GATT 1994, 
which requires national treatment with respect to all laws, regulations, and 
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution, or use of imported goods.6 Similarly, national 
treatment is provided for in Article XVII of the GATS7 and Article Three 
of the TRIPs Agreement. However, with regard to the GATS, national 
treatment is not an automatic requirement, but is contingent on the 
concession of a Member making liberalization commitments in trade in 
services. Provisions for national treatment are also found in the TBT 
Agreement, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures (“SPS Agreement”) and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement. 
The principle of national treatment is meant to maintain a competitive 
equality between domestic products and enterprises, on the one hand, and 
those of other Members, on the other. Although the application of the 
national treatment principle varies according to whether it applies to trade 
in goods, trade in services, or intellectual property.8 National treatment is 
 
 
 6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. III.4, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, in 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. art. XVII. 
 8. The GATT 1994 deals with trade in goods. In this area, the principle of national treatment is 
universal, which should apply generally unless exempted by Article XX of the GATT 1994 or other 
provisions of the WTO Agreements. In principle, a border measure on trade in goods should take the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/10
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meant to establish a level playing field between domestic and foreign 
products and enterprises. The scope of “laws, regulations and 
requirements” in Article III.4 of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted 
broadly to include any laws and regulations which might adversely modify 
the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products in 
the internal market.9 
It is noteworthy that Article VIII of the GATS requires Members to 
ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in its territory, in the 
supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, neither acts in a 
manner inconsistent with that member’s specific commitments nor abuses 
its monopoly position to act in other markets in a manner inconsistent with 
commitments. This provision is somewhat similar to “abuse control” 
exercised by domestic competition law authorities in some countries.10 
B. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 
The Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) principle requires that a Member 
accord goods and services of another Member treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords to goods and services of all other Members. This 
principle also applies in the area of intellectual property. This principle is 
designed to guarantee equal competitive conditions between goods and 
services of different foreign members. It applies universally with regard to 
the GATT 1994, the GATS, and the TRIPs Agreement, although the 
GATS allows a Member to attach a reservation to this principle and 
exclude its application in part or in whole. 
MFN treatment is provided for in Article I of the GATT 1994, Article 
II of the GATS and Article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement. Like the principle 
 
 
form of a tariff, and the tariff rates should not exceed the concession rates agreed upon in trade 
negotiations. The principle of national treatment enshrined in Article III.4 is to ensure that a tariff 
concession is not circumvented by an internal measure that discriminates against foreign like-products. 
In trade in services, the principle of national treatment is not a universal principle. It applies when a 
Member makes a concession that with regard to a particular sector it grants national treatment to 
foreign providers of services. Also, it is often hard to distinguish between border measures and 
domestic measures. For example, if a foreign insurance company of a Member establishes a subsidiary 
in the territory of another Member and provides insurance services, this is a type of trade in services. 
However, for the purposes of regulation of this insurance company, there are no border measures 
similar to tariffs. In the area of intellectual property, national treatment was traditionally envisaged in 
the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention even before the TRIPs Agreement. 
 9. Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, BISD 7S/60, L/833, at 
para. 12 (Oct. 23, 1958). 
 10. See, e.g., Case 322/81, NV Netherlandische Banden Industrie Michelin v. EC Comm’n, 1983 
E.C.R. 3461; Case 85/76, Hoffman la Roche & Co. AG v. EC Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461; Case 6/72, 
Europemballage Corp. & Continental Car Co. v. EC Comm’n, 1973 E.C.R. 215. 
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of national treatment, equality of competitive conditions is broadly 
interpreted. In the Bananas case, for example, the Panel and the Appellate 
Body held that Article II of the GATS should be given a wide scope.11 
C. Transparency 
The two-part requirement of transparency is also a cornerstone of the 
WTO. The first part is the obligation imposed on Members of the WTO to 
publish or make publicly available all relevant regulations before 
application, the requirement of impartial administration of such 
regulations and the right to review decisions taken under them. The second 
part is the requirement that Members give notice of governmental actions 
to the WTO and other Members. 
The principle of transparency is provided for in Article X of the GATT 
1994, Article III of the GATS and Article Sixty-three of the TRIPs 
Agreement. Provisions of transparency are included in many other WTO 
Agreements in Annex 1A. This principle serves as the basis for a rule-
oriented foreign trade policy and for maintaining stability and 
predictability of the trade law regulations of Members. 
D. Due Process of Law 
The requirement of transparent governmental processes is an important 
part of the concept of due process of law. A closely related principle is the 
procedural due process principle present in the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures. The procedures for dispute settlement at the WTO are 
provided for in the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).12 Provisions in the DSU are generally 
designed to establish due process in the enforcement of the WTO 
Agreements. Especially significant is Article Eleven of the DSU, which 
provides that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and 
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”13 
Although no similar provision exists for the Appellate Body, the same due 
process requirement applies to its procedures. 
 
 
 11. European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/R; WT/DS27/AB/R. 
 12. Dispute Settlement Understanding, Apr. 19, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 
1226, in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 4. 
 13. Id. art. 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/10
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All of the principles of the WTO discussed above are designed to 
establish and maintain conditions conducive to competition among 
enterprises of different members of the WTO in trade in goods, services, 
and intellectual property, and to ensure that the rule of law prevails in the 
enforcement of trade rules. It is clear that those principles are common to 
the WTO system and to competition policy. 
IV. CASE-LAW IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES WHICH 
HAVE SOME BEARING ON COMPETITION POLICY 
The Photographic Film case (Kodak/Fuji),14 decided by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (“DSB”) in 1998, revealed that the WTO was ineffective 
in dealing with private restraints of trade. In this case, the U.S. 
government filed a claim with the WTO regarding measures taken by the 
Japanese government in connection with the distribution of film in Japan. 
The U.S. government argued that the actions constituted a violation as 
well as a non-violation of the WTO Agreements. In essence, the U.S. 
government argued that some restrictive features of the Japanese 
distribution system, which allegedly had been constructed under directives 
of the Japanese government, had foreclosed the film market in Japan to 
foreign-produced film. The United States claimed that the Japanese 
government imposed “liberalization countermeasures” in the 1970s, when 
the film market in Japan was liberalized in order to offset the effect of 
trade liberalization. The U.S. claimed that, under the leadership of the 
Japanese government, the leading film manufacturer Fuji Film Company, 
built an exclusive distributorship in Japan and excluded Kodak films from 
the country. This case involved a distribution system created by Fuji with 
a market share of about seventy percent, in which four distributors of Fuji 
acted as exclusive distributors of Fuji products. 
The WTO Panel ruled that the United States failed to prove that the 
Japanese government had in fact constructed this exclusive distributorship 
agreement in the film industry in Japan. Because the U.S. government 
decided not to appeal the Panel’s ruling, the Panel Report was adopted and 
became final. 
Although the U.S. government’s claim was rejected by the Panel, this 
case raised an important issue regarding the relationship between WTO 
Agreements and competition policy. The U.S. government tried to show 
that, although on the surface the alleged exclusive distributorship may 
 
 
 14. Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998). 
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have been a private restraint, the Japanese government played a decisive 
role in bringing this into existence and, therefore, the restraint was 
essentially a governmental measure. The U.S. government produced a 
large volume of documents to prove that the heavy hand of the 
government was operating in the creation of this distributorship. The 
Japanese government likewise produced a large volume of documents to 
disprove the claim of the United States. 
In this case, the U.S. action failed, and this failure seems to have been 
due to the fact that it aimed at the wrong target. Whatever the nature of the 
Japanese government’s “liberalization countermeasures” and the role of 
the government in the creation of the exclusive distributorship may have 
been, the central issue in this dispute was that of private conduct, i.e. the 
distribution policy of Fuji, a private enterprise. Unless it can deal directly 
with issues of private conduct, the dispute settlement system of the WTO 
with regards to such conduct will remain largely ineffective.15 
This case shows that the WTO Agreements as they exist today are not 
efficient in dealing with issues of private restraint of international trade, 
which may be as detrimental to the free international trading system as 
governmental barriers. As liberalization of trade progresses through trade 
negotiations and government trade barriers are lowered and eliminated, the 
WTO must address issues of restrictive business practices of private 
enterprises which restrain trade and counteract the effect of liberalization 
achieved through trade negotiations. In the long run, therefore, the WTO 
system will not be complete without the inclusion of competition policy 
within its framework in one form or another. This is indeed the lesson of 
the Photographic Film case. 
Two more cases have raised issues related to competition policy. One 
is the United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 case16 in which the 
 
 
 15. One alternative that the United States government could have tried is an extraterritorial 
application of U.S. antitrust laws. The U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines state that the U.S. 
government can exercise jurisdiction over actions which occur abroad and bring about the effect of 
foreclosing that market to U.S. products. See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Apr. 1995. The U.S. 
government (and/or Kodak) could have tried this avenue and brought an antitrust action against Fuji. 
Kodak filed a complaint with the Japanese Fair Trade Commission regarding this matter, but the 
Commission did not take any action. 
 16. United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Panel, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 
2000) (the EC Case); WT/DS162/R (May 29, 2000) (the Japan Case); Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) (the EC Case); WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) (the Japan Case). 
For comments on the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, see Hiroko Yamane, The Anti-Dumping Act 
of 1916: A Victory at What Cost?, 7 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 1-18 (2001); Mitsuo Matsushita & 
Douglas E. Rosenthal, The WTO Makes a Mistake—Analysis and Perspective, BNA, Antitrust & Trade 
Reg. Rep., No. 2021, Aug. 15, 2001. 
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European Communities and Japan claimed that the very existence of the 
U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was a violation of U.S. obligations under 
the WTO Agreements. The Anti-Dumping Act authorizes criminal 
prosecution and a treble damage action on the part of a U.S. domestic 
industry if dumping occurs and if, by that dumping, the U.S. industry is 
injured. The Panel and the Appellate Body held that this U.S. law is 
applicable to dumping in the sense of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and, 
therefore, must conform to the requirements of that Article. Because the 
Article provides for an anti-dumping duty as the only measure to deal with 
dumping, the 1916 Act, which provides for criminal sanctions and treble 
damages as remedies for dumping, is inconsistent with the GATT 1994. 
The U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was characterized by the Panel 
and the Appellate Body as an anti-dumping law. In the United States, this 
law is characterized as “not an antitrust statute but one whose subject 
matter is closely related to the antitrust rules regarding predation.”17 
However, the scope of anti-dumping legislation and that of competition 
law regarding dumping may at least partially overlap. International price 
discrimination, which satisfies the requirements for dumping challenges 
under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-dumping Agreement, 
may also satisfy the requirements to be challenged under competition law 
as predatory pricing. 
In the United States, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price 
discrimination according to areas if such price discrimination causes 
competitive injury and there is no justification (such as meeting a 
competition’s price) for that price discrimination.18 Given the fact that 
U.S. antitrust laws are applied extraterritorially, price discrimination by a 
foreign enterprise, which sets a high price for a product in the domestic 
market and a lower price when it exports a like-product to the United 
States may violate that particular law. Remedies for a violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act include an injunction issued by courts or the 
Federal Trade Commission and the award of treble damages for losses 
sustained by a U.S. domestic industry. If this challenge is made in the 
United States, other Members of the WTO may file a petition with the 
WTO’s DSB and argue that the only remedy should be an anti-dumping 
 
 
 17. U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 15, at 8. For U.S. court decisions on this 
subject, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Geneva Steel Co. 
v. Ranger Steel Supply Corp., 980 S. Supp. 1209 (D. Utah 1997); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980).  
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000) (injunctive relief); id. § 15 (treble damages). 
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duty under the Appellate Body’s holding in the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 
case. 
Because the Panel and the Appellate Body rulings in this case deny a 
criminal action and the recovery of damages by a private party suffering 
from dumping, these rulings will have an impact on the relationship 
between anti-dumping legislation and competition law. 
In the Canada Dairy (II) case, in which the issue was an agricultural 
subsidy given by the Canadian government to milk producers in Canada.19 
Under this subsidy regime, the Canadian government established a price 
support system for milk sold for domestic uses that kept domestic prices at 
a high level. Originally, the Canadian measures included price controls on 
fresh milk that was to be sold to processors of milk (dairy products 
producers) for export purposes. However, this system was challenged by 
the United States at the WTO because the scheme constituted a prohibited 
subsidy under the WTO Agreements. This was the Canada Dairy (I) case. 
The Panel and the Appellate Body held that the Canadian subsidy was 
contrary to the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”).20 Thereupon, the 
Canadian government modified the subsidy system and abolished the price 
controls on the sales of fresh milk for export purposes. 
The United States challenged this regime again and insisted that this 
was still in contravention of the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM 
Agreement. The Appellate Body stated that this new scheme could 
constitute a subsidy inconsistent with the WTO Agreements if producers 
of fresh milk sold it to producers of dairy products at a price below cost. 
However, the Appellate Body could not decide whether there was a below-
cost sale or not, because of the lack of fact finding on the part of the Panel. 
The issue in this case seems to be the borderline between the realm of 
subsidy law and that of competition law. One may question whether the 
concept of subsidy may be stretched to this extent. It may be that this type 
of issue is more appropriately dealt with as a predatory pricing issue under 
competition laws. However, if a private party challenges a subsidy of this 
type as predatory pricing, there may be a counterargument that the remedy 
should be a countervailing duty under Article VI of the GATT 1994. This 
is a logical consequence of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 case, which 
 
 
 19. Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WT/DS103/AB/RW, and WT/DS113/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2001). 
 20. Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WT/DS103/AB/RW and WT/DS113/AB/RW (Oct. 13, 1999). 
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states that the only remedy to dumping should be the imposition of an anti-
dumping duty under Article VI of the GATT 1994. 
A recent telecommunications dispute between the United States and 
Mexico involves competition policy issues. On April 17, 2002, the United 
States filed a petition with the WTO’s DSB to establish a panel to resolve 
the dispute between the two countries with regard to telecommunications. 
The United States claims that Mexico failed to honor its GATS 
commitments regarding the telecommunications industry.21 The United 
States argues that, although Mexico had inscribed specific market-access 
and national treatment commitments for basic telecommunications 
services in its GATS Schedule of Commitment, it failed to ensure that 
Telmex (the dominant Mexican telecommunications entity) provided 
interconnection to U.S. cross-border basic telecoms suppliers on 
reasonable rates, terms and conditions. Among other charges, the United 
States argues that the Mexican rules do not prevent Telmex from engaging 
in anti-competitive practices. 
The Mexican rules give Telmex sole authority to negotiate the rate that 
foreign basic telecommunications service suppliers must pay to their 
Mexican counterparts to connect their telephone calls in Mexico. By law, 
all Mexican basic telecommunications suppliers, including Telmex, must 
incorporate that rate into their interconnection contracts with foreign 
cross-boarder basic telecommunicatios suppliers. The rules also ensure 
that Telmex receives the greatest share of the revenue generated from this 
charge, regardless of how many calls it connects from abroad. 
The United States argues that the Mexican rules empower Telmex to 
engage in monopolistic practices with respect to connection rates for 
cross-boarder basic telecommunications services and create an effective 
dominance by Telmex to set rates for international interconnection. 
This case had just started at the time I was writing this Article, and it is 
premature to predict the outcome of any Panel and/or Appellate Body 
proceedings. However, this case is noteworthy not only because it is the 
first case in which GATS issues are the main subject-matter of dispute at 
the WTO but also because an issue relating to abuse of a dominant 
position in a telecommunications market is raised. 
 
 
 21. DSB Establishes Panels for Mexico Telecom, Poultry Disputes, Inside U.S. Trade, May 3, 
2002; U.S. Panel Request In Mexico Telecom Fight, 7-8 (Feb. 15, 2002), Inside U.S. Trade, 8-10 (May 
3, 2002). 
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V. ACTIVITIES OF THE WTO WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND 
COMPETITION 
The idea of introducing competition law and policy into the trade arena 
was conceived by the framers of the Havana Charter, the predecessor of 
the GATT 1947. Chapter V of the Havana Charter was devoted to 
competition law and policy. Since that time, the idea of international 
competition policy has been debated in many international fora, including 
the United Nations, the GATT 1947, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). 
The Ministerial Conference of the WTO held in 1997 in Singapore 
decided to establish a group to study the relationship between competition 
policy and trade (the “Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy”) with a view towards introducing competition 
policy into the WTO. The Working Group has published annual reports 
since its creation.22 These reports reveal that there is general agreement 
among Members of the WTO that the WTO and competition policy share 
common objectives, i.e. the promotion of the free market, consumer 
welfare, and efficiency. There is also a consensus that private anti-
competitive practices, such as international cartels dividing up the 
international market and fixing prices, are harmful to the WTO system. 
However, views sharply conflict as to the ways to deal with specific 
issues.  
Developing countries are generally opposed to the idea of introducing 
an agreement on competition policy within the WTO that would be 
compulsory for WTO Members. The introduction of such an agreement 
would still be premature for them and may be too intrusive to the national 
policies of some developing countries. For example, some developing 
countries argue that excessive WTO intervention into their industrial and 
development policies may be detrimental to their national goals. 
As to the relationship between anti-dumping and competition policy, 
some argue that trade-restricting features of anti-dumping legislation can 
be mitigated through the incorporation of some competition principles, 
while others contend that anti-dumping legislation and competition policy 
are based on different constituencies and cannot be reconciled. 
 
 
 22. WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report to 
the General Council, WT/WCTCP/1 (Nov. 28, 1997); WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998); WT/WGTCP/3 
(Oct. 11, 1999); WT/WGTCP/4 (Nov. 30, 2000); WT/WGTCP/5 (Oct. 8, 2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/10
p363 Matsushita book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] WTO AND COMPETITION POLICY 375 
 
 
 
 
As to the form of a competition policy agreement, some prefer a 
multilateral scheme similar to that found in the WTO. Others argue that a 
multilateral agreement is too idealistic and bilateral agreements should be 
preferred. Others again argue that regional agreements may be more 
realistic. 
VI. COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS 
MEMBER STATES 
The European Community presented a position paper,23 in which it 
clarified its view on whether competition policy should be introduced into 
the WTO and, if so, the form of such an agreement on competition policy 
in the WTO should take. It proposed a binding WTO framework 
agreement on competition policy.24 The EC’s position paper states that 
international co-operation is essential for:  
the facilitation of consultations and exchanges of information 
among competition authorities in order to better address anti-
competitive practices of common concern; the management of 
jurisdictional conflicts (or trade conflicts) through consultations and 
the application of comity principles; the reinforcement of the 
capacity of newly established (or small) competition authorities 
both through general technical assistance and enforcement 
cooperation; and the reduction of unnecessary costs to international 
business transactions through better coordination of investigations 
and remedies.25 
The EC proposed that WTO negotiations focus on three key issues: 
• core principles on domestic competition law and policy; 
• cooperation modalities, including both case-specific cooperation 
and more general exchanges of experiences; and 
• support for the reinforcement of competition institutions in 
developing countries, including through a more coherent and 
 
 
 23. WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Communication from the European Community and its Members, WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 
2000). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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enhanced approach to technical assistance for capacity 
building.26 
Another proposal is to establish a Competition Policy Committee 
within the WTO which “would provide a forum for examining whether 
greater convergence can be promoted on competition policy questions of 
importance for the trading system.”27 
In the EC’s proposal, the key elements of a multilateral framework on 
competition policy should consist of the following: 
• Core principles of competition law and policy: 
• “Agreement to have a competition authority endowed with 
sufficient enforcement powers;” 
• “Competition law should be based on the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of the nationality of firms.” The 
EC explains that this is to suggest” a binding core principle 
on the need to avoid any de jure discrimination as regards the 
domestic competition law framework;” 
• “Transparency as regards the legislative framework, 
including as regards any sectorial exclusions;” 
• “Guarantees of due process; “and 
• “Agreement to treat “hard-core” cartels as a serious breach of 
competition law; hard-core cartels are defined as, among 
others, “agreements among . . . competitors involving price 
fixing, bid rigging, output restrictions or customer allocation 
and market divisions.” 
• Cooperation modalities: 
• Case-specific co-operation. This includes exchanges of case-
related information and evidence, and consultations and 
exchanges of views on cases affecting the important interests 
of other WTO Members. The inclusion of “negative comity” 
is also suggested; and 
 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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• “general exchange of information and experience and joint 
analysis” and the establishment of a Competition Committee 
to perform this function. 
• Technicall and enforcement assistance for competition 
institutions in developing countries. 
It is not entirely clear which part of the above EC proposals are binding 
rather than hortatory. It seems that the part dealing with core principles of 
competition law and policy is recommended as binding. Therefore, this 
proposed agreement can be characterized as partly binding and partly non-
binding. 
VII. THE ICPAC REPORT 
In 1997, the U.S. government organized the International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee (the “ICPAC Committee”) and commissioned 
it to study international competition issues and submit a report with 
recommendations regarding possible measures for U.S. government 
consideration. The Committee submitted its Report28 in 1999 and 
recommended proposals for international cooperation in competition 
policy matters. The recommendations cover wide issues, including: 
• Multi-jurisdictional mergers; 
• Strategies for facilitating substantive convergence and 
minimizing conflict; 
• Rationalizing the merger review process through targeted 
reform; 
• International anti-cartel enforcement and inter-agency 
enforcement co-operation; 
• Where trade and competition intersect; and 
• Preparing for the future.29 
The Report is skeptical about introducing a comprehensive agreement 
on competition policy within the WTO. This skepticism stems from the 
 
 
 28. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Final Report, International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
Washington, D.C., 2000, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Dec. 
19, 2003). 
 29. Id. tbl. of contents. 
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concern that a hasty introduction of a comprehensive competition 
agreement into the WTO may bring about, inter alia: 
• The possible distortion of competition standards through the 
quid pro quo nature of WTO negotiations; 
• The potential intrusion of WTO dispute settlement panels into 
domestic regulatory practices; and 
• The inappropriateness of obliging countries to adopt competition 
laws.30 
In the view of the ICPAC Committee, “national authorities are best 
suited to address anti-competitive practices of private firms that are 
occurring on their territory.”31 
The Report places heavy emphasis on positive comity through which a 
trading nation requests that another trading nation take steps under its own 
domestic law to deal with anti-competitive conduct that occurs in the 
latter’s territory but adversely affects competition in the former’s territory. 
It recognizes, however, that there is a limit to the effectiveness of positive 
comity. The Report does not rule out the possibility of extraterritorial 
application of domestic competition laws to deal with anti-competitive 
conduct that occurs outside the territory but brings about adverse impacts 
inside the territory of a nation.32 
The Report recommends that there should be a “Global Competition 
Initiative” toward a “greater convergence of competition law and analysis, 
common understandings and common culture.”33 To accomplish this 
purpose, such a Global Competition Initiative should include: 
• Multilateralized and deepened positive comity; 
• Agreement on developing consensus principles in the practices 
for merger control laws; 
• Considering the scope of governmental exemptions and 
immunities; 
• Considering approaches to multinational merger control; 
 
 
 30. Id. (Executive Summary). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. ch. 5. 
 33. Id. ch. 6. 
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• Considering frontier subjects such as e-commerce and 
competition; 
• Undertaking collaborative analysis of such issues as global 
cartels; and 
• Possible mediation of dispute and technical assistance.34 
The Report emphasizes that a “Global Competition Initiative does not 
require a new international bureaucracy or substantial funding.”35 It can be 
accomplished by informal understandings among the trading nations after 
the model of the Group of Seven (“G-7”). 
In essence, the Report proposes that there should be a “soft” 
convergence of competition policy and law among trading nations and no 
formal organization or institution is necessary. Also, there should be no 
mandatory requirements with which trading nations must comply. It can 
be accomplished through exchange of views among them and the 
experiences of working together. 
Based on the recommendations of the ICPAC Report, the U.S. 
government initiated “The International Competitive Network” (“ICN”), 
in which enforcement agencies of governments informally meet and 
discuss competition-policy-related matters of their mutual concern and co-
operate with each other without creating any formal international 
organization. Many governments have joined this program.36 
VIII. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION 
The Declaration adopted by the Ministerial Conference held in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001 contains three paragraphs on competition policy 
for future negotiations. The relevant paragraphs are Paragraphs 23, 24 and 
25.37 
Paragraph 23 states: 
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the 
contribution of competition policy to international trade and 
development, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and 
capacity-building in this area as referred to in Paragraph 24, we 
 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. According to the Website of the ICN, about sixty governments have decided to join the ICN. 
Website of the ICN, at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
 37. Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted Nov. 14, 2001. 
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agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference [which must be held within two years of the 
Doha Conference] on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit 
consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations. 
Paragraph 24 states: 
We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed 
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity 
building in this area, including policy analysis and development so 
that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral 
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and 
human and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in 
cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, 
including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral 
channels to provide strengthened and adequately resourced 
assistance to respond to these needs. 
Paragraph 25 states: 
In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working 
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
will focus on the clarification of: core principles, including 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and 
provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary co-
operation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition 
institutions in developing countries through capacity building. Full 
account shall be taken of the needs of developing and least-
developed country participants and appropriate flexibility provided 
to address them. 
At the time of writing this Article, it is not clear whether an 
international negotiation will take place in the WTO with regard to 
competition policy. As Paragraph 23 states, whether or not a negotiation 
starts will depend on whether or not negotiating parties can agree on 
“modalities” of negotiation. The meaning of modalities is not defined and, 
if defined broadly, it may include the substance of negotiations, such as 
the type of international agreement (whether plurilateral or multilateral) to 
be negotiated, or the substance of any such agreement, such as what kinds 
of cartels should be categorized as being prohibited. If so, there may be 
divergent views and it may be difficult to reach consensus. 
Paragraph 24 emphasizes the importance of considering the needs of 
developing and less-developed countries. Technical assistance and 
capacity building in competition policy matters are regarded as central to 
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any competition policy framework which may be included within the 
WTO framework. If any framework for competition policy is introduced 
into the WTO, technical assistance and capacity building certainly will be 
incorporated as an important component. 
Paragraph 25 declares that the Working Group should discuss core 
principles, including transparency, non-discrimination, procedural 
fairness, hardcore cartels and other related matters. One issue in this 
regard may be whether to include in the category of hardcore cartels only 
international cartels, export cartels, and import cartels that directly affect 
international trade, or purely domestic cartels as well. These issues are left 
to future consideration. 
IX. OPTIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WTO 
After considering the Working Group reports, the ICPAC Report, and 
the views expressed by Members of the WTO regarding this matter, the 
following tentative options are offered for consideration. 
Option 1: A Declaration that Competition Policy is an Integral Part of the 
WTO Regime 
This option is merely to suggest that the WTO declares, in the form of 
a Ministerial Declaration, that competition policy is an integral part of the 
WTO regime. A Ministerial Declaration would state that, through the trade 
negotiations conducted under the auspices of the GATT, governmental 
trade barriers have been reduced; that there are still considerable 
governmental trade barriers; that in due course, such barriers will be 
further reduced; and that as governmental barriers are reduced, private 
barriers are recognized as becoming more serious impediments to trade. It 
would further state that, under these circumstances, it is important for the 
WTO to establish principles of competition policy within the framework 
of the WTO in order to deal with both governmental and private trade 
barriers. It would state that non-discriminatory conditions of competition 
are a basic objective of WTO law and that competition policy should 
become an integral part of the WTO legal framework. 
Option 2: A Plurilateral Agreement 
I recommend a plurilateral agreement on competition policy within the 
framework of the WTO with a two-stage implementation. In the first 
stage, there would be binding rules, which would prohibit such private 
anti-competitive conduct that directly injures the objectives of the WTO, 
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such as international cartels, import cartels, and export cartels. In the 
second stage, the WTO would consider the introduction of an international 
agreement on competition policy which would cover a wider area, 
including vertical restraints and mergers and acquisitions. 
Such a plurilateral agreement on competition policy might be called the 
“Plurilateral Agreement on Competition and Trade” (“PACT”). The PACT 
would contain rules regarding transparency, objectivity, and due process 
of law, as well as the principles of most-favoured-nation treatment and 
national treatment in the application and enforcement of the Members’ 
competition laws. 
In its initial stage, the PACT should incorporate rules that deal with 
matters directly affecting trade between Members of the WTO, such as 
international cartels and export/import cartels. The rules should state that 
public and private measures which restrict trade among Members are 
contrary to the purpose of the WTO and can undermine the benefits of 
liberal trade achieved through trade negotiations. 
The WTO might consider the possibility of introducing rules of 
competition regarding conduct such as mergers and acquisitions, the 
regulation of which primarily belongs to the realm of domestic policies. In 
such consideration, the WTO should take into account whether rules of 
competition policy on such matters will enhance the objectives of the 
WTO and promote the effectiveness of the WTO system. 
The WTO should formulate additional rules regarding the 
implementation of Article 40 of the TRIPs Agreement in order to give 
more guidance to Members seeking to introduce legislation on restrictive 
business practices involved in the licensing of technology. The WTO 
should clarify the requirements contained in other provisions of the WTO 
Agreements which are related to competition policy, such as Article 8 of 
the TBT Agreement, Article VII of the GATT 1994, Article 9 of the 
TRIMs Agreement, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and Article 11(b) of 
the Agreement of Safeguards, in order to assist Members to implement 
such provisions. 
The WTO should consider whether some principles of competition 
policy may be incorporated into agreements regarding trade remedies, 
such as the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 
The WTO should consider the establishment of a Competition 
Committee, a permanent group of experts on competition and trade (such 
as the Permanent Group of Experts on Subsidies and Trade Relations 
provided for in Article 24 of the SCM Agreement), which would advise 
WTO bodies on competition policy matters. 
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Option 3: A Non-binding Multilateral Framework for Cooperation in 
Competition Policy 
This option is aimed at establishing a multilateral framework for 
cooperation in competition policy among Members of the WTO. The 
provisions in this agreement would be hortatory or exhortative rather than 
binding, as opposed to “the Covered Agreements” that are binding on 
WTO Members. This agreement would not be legally binding; thus, a 
violation of its provisions would not be met with action based on the DSU 
or with economic retaliation determined by the DSB. It would not be a 
part of the Covered Agreements that could be invoked by one Member of 
the WTO against another Member. Instead, it would provide for a 
notification of legal action taken under the competition laws of a Member 
when such an action provokes international implications; a scheme for 
exchange of information regarding competition policy and the 
enforcement of law; a mechanism for co-operation among the enforcement 
agencies of the competition policies and laws of members in coordination 
of policies; mutual assistance in investigation and enforcement of law, 
including “positive comity”; and a mechanism for technical assistance, 
education, and dissemination of information regarding the competition 
laws and policies of Members. 
Option 3 is modeled after bilateral agreements on competition policy 
that have been signed by a number of countries such as, among others, the 
United States, the European Communities and some of its Members, 
Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In spite of the narrow 
coverage, bilateral agreements have worked well in building co-operation 
and promoting competition policies among participants. One of the 
reasons for success may have been their informal and non-binding nature. 
Although some may argue that this type of multilateral agreement has no 
“teeth,” it is probably the most realistic approach for today. A non-binding 
agreement such as this is unusual for the WTO, which is essentially a rule-
enforcement mechanism. However, there is no reason that the WTO must 
reject an agreement simply because it is non-binding. 
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Option 4: A Partly Binding Multilateral Framework on Competition Law 
and Policy 
This is modeled after the proposal made by the European Community 
in its Communication dated September 25, 2000.38 In this proposal, there 
would be three parts in the framework. The first part would contain the 
core principles, such as those of non-discrimination, transparency, and the 
due process of law, as well as the prohibition of hardcore cartels. This part 
would be binding and Members would be obligated to observe its 
provisions. The second part would consist of arrangements for exchange 
of information, including case-specific and general information. The third 
part would consist of technical assistance to developing countries in their 
efforts to establish competition laws and enforcement agencies as well as 
capacity building with regard to enforcement of competition law and 
promotion of competition policy. 
X. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
A quick glance at views expressed in various reports and the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration may lead one to proceed with caution and avoid a 
hasty conclusion. One may think that the establishment of a 
comprehensive and binding international agreement on competition policy 
in the WTO or elsewhere is still premature. It seems realistic to construct a 
more informal and non-binding scheme for co-operation among trading 
nations with respect to competition policy. A good starting point may be 
bilateral agreements. There are already some bilateral agreements in 
existence, such as the United States/European Union Agreement,39 the 
United States/Canada Agreement40 and the United States/Japan 
Agreement.41 All are non-binding and all contain provisions for exchange 
 
 
 38. See WTO, supra note 23. 
 39. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of 
the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Agreement signed 
at Washington, D.C., Sept. 23, 1991, in JOSEPH U.P. GRIFFIN, U.S. International Antitrust 
Enforcement, A Practical Guide to the Agencies’ 1995 Guidelines, B-1402-1406 (The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc. 1996). 
 40. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, 
Aug. 1 and 3, 1995, 2028 U.N.T.S. 135, 35 I.L.M. 309 (1996), in GRIFFIN, supra note 39. 
 41. Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States 
Concerning Co-operation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, in NICHIBEI DOKKIN KYORYOKU 
KYOTEI [U.S./JAPAN CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-MONOPOLY MATTER], North America 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
international/docs/3740.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
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of information, notification of actions that one of the parties takes under its 
domestic competition laws which affects the other, and positive and 
negative comity. 
As the ICPAC Report suggest, provisions incorporated in bilateral 
agreements on competition policy can be made into a multilateral 
agreement. Although provisions in such bilateral agreements are not 
compulsory and not enforceable through a dispute settlement process such 
as that incorporated in the WTO system, many bilateral agreements have 
contributed much toward the promotion of the spirit of international co-
operation. 
One possibility may be to introduce an informal and non-binding 
agreement on a multilateral basis into the WTO system. Currently, all of 
the WTO Agreements are binding, and non-compliance with any of them 
is subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure. This proposed 
agreement on international competition policy would be non-binding, and 
non-compliance with its provisions would not be subject to the WTO’s 
dispute settlement process. Although an introduction of such a non-
binding agreement into the WTO system may at first seem to be 
incongruous with the other WTO Agreements, there is no reason that the 
WTO should object to introduction of such an agreement. Although it 
would be outside the scope of dispute settlement in the WTO, in so far as 
promotes free and open markets and the common objectives, such an 
agreement and the WTO would complement and reinforce each other. 
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